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Abstract:  
This paper studies the pro-poor growth in the Latino American Andean countries. We 
first present different definitions of pro-poorness and the related methods in order to 
generate the statistically robust results for classes of pro-poor measures. Also, we 
present the non anonymous pro-poor approach and we propose also a new method to 
study the inter-temporal pro-poor growth with the aim to capture the change of wellbeing 
of the poor over time. We apply these procedures to five L.A. countries, which are 
Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela for the period between 2005 and 2010. 
In general, we find strong statistical evidence that the Andean L.A. countries growths 
have been absolutely and relatively pro-poor for the period between 2005 and 2010. 
However, the 2008 world economic crisis has affected temporarily growth and the latter 
was not absolutely pro-poor during this economic crisis. Starting from 2009, the L.A. 
countries have registered a remarkable economic recovery. This recovery has helped to 
growth to absolutely pro-poor and thus, to continue to reduce poverty in this region of 
world. 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
During the two last decades, the level of interdependence between the country
economies has increased sharply. This has been associated with a combination
of events including the fall of socialist economic system, the acceleration of in-
ternational trade liberalization, the birth of new economic communities such as
the European Community, and the revolution in communications and information
management. Even if the environment of this new era has contributed to im-
proved economic efficiency at the global level, the associated distributive effects
remain poorly documented. Greater economic interdependence has also strength-
ened linkages of economic shocks. In recent years, economists have become more
familiar with the global nature of economic shocks and how economic troubles in
one country may deeply affect the economy of another. For fragile developing
countries, it is crucial to understand the nature of each economic shock and how it
can affect theirs various economic sectors. The increasing frequency of the world
economic crisis makes the economic performance of developing countries more
volatile. Public interventions are thus required to ensure an economic environment
that better supports the poor and to help the most affected populations during pe-
riods of economic crisis. For many decades, Latin America (L.A. ) in general
—and Andean countries in particular— was the most unequal region in the world.
Its achievements with respect to poverty reduction are vulnerable to a reversal
in the pace of growth. In this region, many social programs were designed and
implemented to support the extremely poor and to help vulnerable populations re-
turn to economic activity. The design and targeting of these social programs have
been continuously improved. Over the last decade, the economic performance of
Latin American countries has been good, but their economic growth was deeply
impacted by the 2008 economic crisis.
Progress in poverty reduction strategies across the region has been reported in
all Andean countries, especially over the second half of the last decade. However,
little is known about the distributional effects of this recent period of rapid growth
and how it compares with the previous growth periods in terms of poverty reduc-
tion. Assessing the pro-poorness of growth, and its consequences, has become a
common topic for policy discussion in development economics circles. Analyz-
ing distributional changes during the expansion phase of the economic cycle and
determining how pro-poor these changes is an area of research that continues to
be conceptually and empirically challenging. For instance, policy-oriented dis-
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cussions on how to define pro-poor growth or on the proper measure of poverty
to be used1 have been recently followed by theoretical works about the impor-
tance of income mobility when analyzing the pro-poorness of growth.2 Whether
considering its absolute or relative definition, and under both anonymous or non-
anonymous assumptions, the analysis of the pro-poorness of changes in the in-
come distribution presents a question that calls for an empirical answer.
Given the falling poverty headcount ratios in the Andean region, it can easily
be assumed that recent growth has been pro-poor according to the broader (abso-
lute and anonymous) definition. However, the question of whether this absolute
pro-poor growth is also relatively pro-poor (even non-anonymously) has yet to be
answered. More importantly, the potential sources of absolute pro-poor growth
also need to be determined. For example, some authors (e.g. Kraay (2004)) ap-
ply standard poverty decomposition techniques to identify three potential sources
of pro-poor growth: (C1) a high rate of growth of average incomes; (C2) a high
sensitivity of poverty to growth in average incomes; and (C3) a poverty-reducing
pattern of growth in relative incomes. The analysis of the pro-poorness of the
most recent growth episode in the Andean countries has yet to have been carried
out rigorously. An empirical response to related questions would contribute to the
ongoing debate about the distributional effects of the recent period of rapid growth
experienced in the Latin American and Caribbean region.
1.2 Objective
The main objective of this paper is to empirically assess the pro-poorness
of distributive changes over the last cycle of expansion, contraction and recov-
ery (2005-2010) in five Andean countries (Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and
Venezuela). The goal is to empirically evaluate the pro-poorness of distributive
changes using the framework developed in Duclos and Wodon (2004) and follow-
ing the methodological approach of Araar, Duclos, Audet, and Makdissi (2007).
1First, we have absolute pro-poor growth, which is growth that reduces poverty
(Ravallion and Chen (2003)). Secondly, there is relative pro-poor growth, which refers to a sit-
uation where poverty falls by more than it would have if all incomes had grown at the same rate
(McCulloch and Baulch (2000); Kakwani and Pernia (2000))
2Most conventional growth incidence analysis is presented in a framework of anonymity, which
in this context refers to the assumption that exchanging the incomes of any two individuals in
any given distribution should not affect the evaluation of pro-poorness. Most recent contribu-
tions (Araar, Duclos, Audet, and Makdissi (2009); Bourguignon (2011)) lift this assumption and
explore the consequences on distributional analyses
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We aim to apply these techniques: to obtain judgments for absolute and relative
pro-poorness of growth in the 2005-10 period; to assess the marginal pro-poorness
of the collapse in growth in 2008/09 and the subsequent recovery in 2009/10; to
learn about the effects on income mobility and the durability of the distributional
effects; and to find some conclusions and implications for policy from the regional
comparisons. Among the criticisms that can be leveled at the non-anonymous pro-
poor growth approach is its dependence on a reference period to define the poor
(see Bourguignon (2011)). Our work contains a new theoretical framework to an-
alyze pro-poor growth in a dynamic manner, where the poor are considered in the
initial and final period.
In practice, household surveys are needed to check whether growth is pro-
poor. We must therefore consider issues relating to estimation, sampling variabil-
ity and statistical inference. We start by proposing sets of null and alternative
hypotheses to test for the absolute and relative pro-poorness of growth. We then
define various estimators of the statistics of interest and derive their sampling dis-
tribution taking full account of the complexity of the usual sampling design, and
of the fact that these statistics of interest typically involve non-linear combinations
of estimators from different, though sometimes dependent samples. This enables
us, among other things, to estimate confidence intervals around the differences
that must be signed in order to conclude that a change has been robustly pro-poor
or not.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the measure-
ment framework. Section 3 deals with issues of estimation and statistical infer-
ence. Section 4 applies measurement and statistical techniques to study pro-poor
growth in each of the five Latin American countries being studied. A compara-
tive study and summary of the results with respect to pro-poorness is presented in
section 5.2. Section 6 concludes.
2 The theoretical framework
2.1 The pro-poor growth
There is a direct connection between the normative judgment of poverty and
that of pro-poorness.3 Two distinct norms to define poverty can be found in the
3See, among many recent contributions to the debate, Bourguignon (2003),
Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire (1998), Dollar and Kraay (2002), Eastwood and Lipton (2001),
United Nations (2000), and World Bank (2000).
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literature. The first is absolute poverty and refers to people with an income below
a predefined shortcut cutoff. With this absolute norm, we only consider the indi-
vidual’s ability to consume and to meet their basic requirements. The second is
relative poverty and refers to people with an income below some threshold relative
to the wealth of the general population. We can start from here to state that the
definition of pro-poorness is closely linked to that of poverty. We can also claim
that a distributive change is pro-poor if it helps reduce poverty, as can be defined
above.
In this paper, we follow the definition of pro-poorness used by Duclos (2009).4
Absolute pro-poorness refers to a situation where incomes of the poor grow by
an absolute amount that is no less than some norm (often set to zero). Relative
pro-poorness requires the increase in the incomes of the poor to be greater than
some norm (often mean income growth).5 The framework of Duclos (2009) also
makes it possible to overcome the difficulty of having to choose 1) a poverty
line to separate the poor from the non-poor, and 2) a set of normative weights
to differentiate among the poor. The framework does this by investigating how
evaluations of pro-poorness can be made robust across a wide classes of pro-poor
evaluation functions and over a range of poverty lines.6
Formally, let y1 =
(
y11, y
1
2, · · · , y1n1
) ∈ ℜn1+ be a vector of non-negative initial
incomes7 (at time 1) of size n1, and let y2 =
(
y21, y
2
2, · · · , y2n2
)
be an analogous
vector of incomes (at time 2) of size n2.
First consider the case of a relative standard, which is simply the average
growth rate, denoted by g. Let W (y1, y2, g, z) be the pro-poor evaluation func-
tion that we want to use, where z > 0 denotes the poverty line. It is defined as
4Also see Araar, Duclos, Audet, and Makdissi (2009)
5Although absolute poverty is usually of greater concern in developing countries, interest in
relative poverty has nevertheless gained significant ground in developed economies (see among
many othersAtkinson, Cantillon, Marlier, and Nolan 2002) and it is also emerging as an important
issue in developing countries too. This emerging importance may be because inequality may limit
growth (see for instance Alesina and Rodrik 1994 and Deininger and Squire 1998), because it is
typically associated with lower poverty reductions for a given level of economic growth, because it
breeds relative deprivation, economic isolation and social exclusion, or because it can be deemed a
problem in and of itself for well-known ethical reasons—such as those developed in Rawls (1971).
6Many different approaches have been proposed to distinguish between the
poor and the non-poor, and to compute and aggregate pro-poorness indices. See,
for instance, McCulloch and Baulch (1999), Kakwani, Khandker, and Son (2003),
Kakwani and Pernia (2000), Ravallion and Chen (2003), Klasen (2004), Essama-Nssah (2005),
Ravallion and Datt (2002), Son (2004) and Essama-Nssah and Lambert (forthcoming).
7Or consumption, wealth, or any other welfare indicator of interest. Also see Klasen (2008)
for a discussion of measurement issues in non-income dimensions.
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the difference between two evaluation functions Π (y1, z) and Π∗ (y2, g, z), each
for time 1 and time 2, respectively, and which are analogous to poverty indices for
each of the two time periods:
W (y1, y2, g, z) ≡ Π∗ (y2, g, z)− Π (y1, z) . (1)
The change from y1 to y2 will be deemed pro-poor if W (y1,y2, g, z) ≤ 0. The
social welfare function of W have the following basic axioms. The first is a focus
axiom, through which W is not sensitive to marginal changes in values of y1 that
exceed z. The second is a population invariance axiom, which says that adding a
replication of a population to that same population has no impact on W . A third
axiom is that of anonymity: permuting the incomes of any two persons in any
given distribution should not affect pro-poor judgements. A fourth normalization
axiom says that in the absence of distributional change (and also with no change
in mean income), then W = 0. A fifth monotonicity axiom imposes that, for
a given g, if anyone’s posterior income increases, W should not increase, and
may sometimes fall. A sixth distribution sensitivity axiom says that the evaluation
functions Π should give more weight to the poorer than to the not-so-poor among
the poor: shifting incomes from the richer to the poorer is by itself a pro-poor
distributional change. This axiom is also known as the Pigou-Dalton principle in
the welfare literature.
2.1.1 Relative pro-poor judgements
Let Fj(y) be the distribution function of distribution j. Also define as Qj(p)
the quantile function for distribution Fj . This is formally defined as Qj(p) =
inf{s ≥ 0|Fj(s) ≥ p} for p ∈ [0, 1]. With a continuous distribution and a strictly
positive income density, Q(p) is simply the inverse of the distribution function,
and is the income of the individual at rank p in the distribution. The FGT indices
(Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984) are then given by:
Pj(z;α) =
∫ Fj(z)
0
(1−Qj(p)/z)α dp. (2)
Pj(z;α = 0) is the headcount index (and the distribution function) at z, and
Pj(z;α = 1) is the average poverty gap.
The class Ω1(g, z+) regroups all of the functionsW that satisfy the focus, pop-
ulation invariance, anonymity, monotonicity, normalization and relative axioms,
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and for which z ≤ z+. Duclos (2009) shows that a movement from y1 to y2 will
be judged as pro-poor by all such functions if and only if
P2 ((1 + g)z;α = 0) ≤ P1 (z;α = 0) for all z ∈ [0, z+]. (3)
Verifying (3) simply involves checking whether—over the range of poverty
lines [0, z+]—the headcount index in the initial distribution is larger than the head-
count index in the posterior distribution when that distribution is normalized by
1 + g. An alternative and equivalent way of checking whether a distributional
change can be declared first-order relatively pro-poor is to compare the ratio of
the quantiles and (1 + g), or, if g is growth in mean income, to compare the
growth of the quantiles to growth of the mean. That is, we check whether, for all
p ∈ [0, F1(z+)],
an-GIC(p) = Q2(p)−Q1(p)
Q1(p)
≥ g. (4)
Using (4) is equivalent to Ravallion and Chen (2003)’s suggestion to use
“growth incidence curves” to check whether growth is pro-poor. These curves
show the growth rates of living standards at different ranks in the population.
The class Ω2(g, z+) is a sub set of Ω1(g, z+) and where the evaluation function
obeys to the distribution sensitivity axiom (sensitive to the situation of the poorer
group). First-order pro-poor judgements can be demanding in expansion periods.
A movement from y1 to y2 will be judged pro-poor by all pro-poor evaluation
function Ω2(g, z+) if and only if
P2 ((1 + g)z;α = 1) ≤ P1 (z;α = 1) for all z ∈ [0, z+]. (5)
Verifying (5) simply involves checking whether the average poverty gap in
the initial distribution is larger than that in the posterior distribution when that
distribution is normalized by 1 + g and this, over the range of poverty lines
[0, z+]. An alternative way of checking condition is by using the Generalized
Lorenz curve. A distributional change is second-order relatively pro-poor if for
all p ∈ [0, F2((1 + g)z+)],
λ(p) ≡ C2(p)
C1(p)
≥ 1 + g. (6)
Expression (6) involves computing the growth rates in the cumulative incomes
of proportions p of the poorest, and to compare8 those growth rates to g. For 1+ g
8This is similar to a condition provided by Son (2004), with the difference that (6) is there
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equal to the ratio of mean income , condition (6) is equivalent to checking whether
the Lorenz curve for y2 is above that of y1 for the range of p ∈ [0, F2((1+ g)z+)].
2.1.2 Evaluating absolute pro-poorness
Absolute pro-poorness can be confirmed by comparing the absolute change
in the income of the poor to some standard, denoted by a and usually set to zero.
The axiom of absolute pro-poorness essentially says that Π∗ should be “translation
invariant” in y and a, i.e., that the evaluation with respect to pro-poorness should
be neutral whenever the absolute gains of the poor are the same as the standard a.
This reference point is consistent with the view that a change is good for the poor
if it increases the poor’s absolute living standards (e.g., Ravallion and Chen 2003).
Hence, the absolute axiom requires that if y + a = y′, then W (y,y′, a, z) = 0.
This allows us to formally define the class of first-order absolute pro-poor
evaluation functions Ω˜1(a, z+) as being comprised of all functions W (·, ·, a, z)
that satisfy the focus, population, anonymity, monotonicity, normalization and
absolute axioms, and for which z ≤ z+. We will later set a to zero in the empirical
section of this paper.
It can then be shown that a movement from y1 to y2 is deemed to be first-order
absolutely pro-poor (that is, pro-poor by all evaluation functions W (·, ·, a, z) that
are members of Ω˜1(a, z+)) if and only if
P2 (z + a;α = 0) ≤ P1 (z;α = 0) for all z ∈ [0, z+]. (7)
An equivalent way of checking whether a distributional change can be declared to
be first-order absolutely pro-poor is to compare the absolute change in the values
of the quantiles for all p ∈ [0, F1(z+)]:
Q2(p)−Q1(p) ≥ a. (8)
A similar condition holds when evaluating absolute second-order pro-
poorness. These evaluations are based on the Ω˜2(a, z+) class of indices, which
is defined similarly to Ω˜1(a, z+), but with the additional requirement of distri-
bution sensitivity. A movement from y1 to y2 is then said to be second-order
absolutely pro-poor if and only if
(z + a)P2 ((z + a;α = 1) ≤ zP1 (z;α = 1) for all z ∈ [0, z+]. (9)
checked over all p ∈ [0, 1].
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A sufficient condition for (9) is then to verify whether, for all p ∈ [0, F2(z+ + a)],
the change in the average income of the bottom p proportion of the population is
larger than a:
C2(p)− C1(p)
p
≥ a. (10)
2.2 Pro-poor growth and poverty reduction
To clearly show the connection between the growth pattern and poverty,
Kraay (2004) proposes decomposition of a change in poverty over time into three
components: (C1) the growth rate of average incomes; (C2) the sensitivity of
poverty to growth in average incomes; and (C3) a poverty-reducing pattern of
growth in relative incomes. In this paper, we propose to use this approach to show
the importance of each of these three components for changes in poverty. For the
class of additive poverty indices, their general definition can take the following
form:
P (pi, z) =
∫ 1
0
pi(Q(p), z)dp. (11)
where pi(Q(p), z) is the contribution of those with an income of Q(p) to the total
poverty index. It follows that over time (t), the change in poverty is indicated by
the change in quantile values . If we denote the semi-elasticity of pi(Q(p), z) with
respect to Q(p) by η(p) = (∂pi(Q(p), z)upslope∂Q(p))Q(p), we can write:
dP (pi, z)
dt
=
∫ 1
0
η(p)g(p)dp. (12)
where g(p) is the growth rate at the pth percentile of income.9 Starting from
equation (12), Kraay (2004) proposes developing this formula as follows:
dP (pi, z)
dt
= g
∫ 1
0
η(p)dp+
∫ 1
0
η(p)(g(p)− g)dp. (13)
The first term of equation (13) captures two sources of pro-poor growth, namely,
the growth in average income and the sensitivity of the poverty index to growth.
9Note that for the class of Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) poverty indices, when α ≥ 1,
η(p) = −αQ(p)
z
(1 − Q(p)/z)α−1+ . When α = 0, we have η(p) = −z if Q(p) = z, and is 0
otherwise. In such cases, we have dP (pi, z)/dt = −zf(z)g(F−1(z)).
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The second part captures the impact of changes in relative incomes. Starting from
this, we can conclude that the significant decrease in poverty may result from
higher sensitivity of poverty to growth or from higher growth in average income.
Of course, this will also depend on the index used to quantify poverty. Further, the
proposed decomposition converges to that proposed by Datt and Ravallion (1992),
the first part of which can be assigned to the growth component, and the second
can be assigned to the redistribution or inequality component. Let g(p)+ = g(p)
if Q(p) < z and zero otherwise. Starting from equation (12), one can propose
another form of decomposition:
dP (pi, z)
dt
= g¯η¯ + Cov(g(p), η(p)). (14)
where g¯ and η¯ are the averages of the g(p)+ and η(p) respectively. If gp is used
to denote the growth in average income of the poor, we arrive at an extended
decomposition.
dP (pi, z)
dt
=
gp
g
g¯
gp
gη¯ + Cov(g(p), η(p)). (15)
Hence, the optimal path of growth to quickly and substantially reduce poverty
comes from a combination of higher income growth among the poor and higher
sensitivity of poverty to income growth. The last condition in turn implies higher
covariance between g(p) and η(p). Equation (14) shows that poverty can coexist
with greater inequality when income growth among the poor is sufficient to enable
them to escape poverty. To what extent is the observed path optimal to efficiently
reduce poverty? The income of a given poor person i must grow by (z/y1,i − 1)
to escape poverty. The γ(p = F (yi)) = (y2,i − y1,i)/(z − y1,i) ratio quantifies the
change in income relative to the poverty line. The γ(p) curve may be useful to
show whether the observed growth path converges to the optimal state.
2.3 Anonymous and non-anonymous pro-poverty
As reported already, among the basic tools to assess pro-poor growth is the
Growth Incidence Curve proposed by Ravallion and Chen (2003). This curve sim-
ply shows the growth of the pth percentile income. Obviously, the pth percentile
or quantile of income does not refer to the same person after income growth has
occurred. This conforms to the anonymous axiom that most of distributive indices
must obey. What do we fail to capture by maintaining this axiom? Even with pro-
poor growth, chronic poverty may persist or grow. Moreover, it is socially less
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desirable to design growth policies that can lead to the horizontal inequity. This
follows the Pareto principal in that it states that an improvement in the wellbeing
of one person should not reduce the wellbeing of another person in a society.
The non-anonymous growth incidence curve (henceforth na-GIC) measures
the income growth rate of the same individual. Bourguignon (2011) and
Grimm (2007a) have already suggested relaxing the anonymity axiom in cases
where the na-GIC curves may reveal additional information about income mobil-
ity. Jenkins and Kerm (2006), Kerm (2009) and Grimm (2007b) have shown how
different results can be obtained from standard and non-anonymous GICs. Relax-
ing the anonymous axiom makes it possible to re-formalize a problem in order to
focus on other topics that involve non-anonymous changes in incomes, such as
income mobility, progressivity, etc. In this paper, we propose to continue to focus
on the welfare of the poor, and do this by considering them in two periods. Two
main related ethical questions can be raised:
• Is the situation of the poor, defined in the initial period, is better than that in
the final period?
• Is the situation of the poor, defined in the finale period, is worse than that in
the initial period?
Measures of anonymous pro-poor can fail to capture the impact of re-ranking or
mobility on poverty. Non-anonymous curves, based on the initial or final reference
periods, can provide additional information. Socially, it is desirable to observe that
the non-anonymous GIC curves with the two periods of reference lie above the
null horizontal line. This would indicate a situation of pro-poor growth without
re-ranking or a downward mobility. Let Φ(yi|yj) denote the conditional income
distribution function in period i, conditional on incomes in period j. Let r denote
the reference period (r ∈ {1=initial, 2=final}). The non-anonymous GIC, with
the initial period as the point of reference can be defined as follows:
na-GIC1(p, r = 1) =
∫
y2dΦ(y2|Q1(p))
Q1(p)
− 1. (16)
The definitional framework is similar to that of Bourguignon (2011). The numer-
ator
∫
y2dΦ(y2|Q1(p)) can be viewed as the expected income of individuals with
an initial income of Q1(p); this makes the na-GIC smooth and allows us to have
a continuous distribution of incomes across the population. By considering the
poor group in final period, the non-anonymous GIC with the initial period as the
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point of reference can be defined as follows:
na-GIC2(p, r = 1) =
Q2(p)∫
y1dΦ(y1|Q2(p)) − 1. (17)
This curve estimates the proportional change in initial period incomes (reference
period r = 1) of those with incomes Q2(p) (the ranking is that of the final period).
Thus, this curve can be used to show the income growth of the poor. Another way
to assess the proportion of the change in income of the poor in the final period is
to use the final period as the point of reference. Formally, we can write:
na-GIC2(p, r = 2) = 1−
∫
y1dΦ(y1|Q2(p))
Q2(p)
. (18)
How can we interpret this curve? Assume that the income of poor individual i
in the final period is yi,2 = Q2(p = 0.3, r = 2) = 8, and his income in the first
period is Qi,1,r=2(p = 0.3) = 5. Then, the increase in income with the final period
as the reference period is 3/8. Thus, this curve simply expresses the proportion of
change in income relative to the final period income. For pro-poor curves, which
usually show income growth (unidirectional change in wellbeing) it is trivial that
we have to express the change with respect to the initial period. As we will see
below, expressing the change with respect to the final period may support analysis
of the change in the wellbeing of the poor over time.
2.4 Inter-temporal wellbeing and pro-poor growth
Here, we propose to move beyond the classical view of pro-poor growth and to
put it into its larger context. More specifically, in this subsection we develop what
we can call intertemporal pro-poor growth. Mainly, we aim to avoid arbitrariness
in selecting the reference period used to specify who is poor. Evidently, it is
socially desirable to focus on the dynamics of the wellbeing of the poor outside of
the reference period. How can we deal with this? Assume that the (∗) denotes the
merged distributions of the two periods. Formally, Q∗(p) is the income of the pth
percentile person with an income of y = Q∗(p) in either of the two periods. Why
do we use this trick?
• In this merged distribution, poor individuals with the same level of income
in the initial and final periods are treated equally and will have the same
percentile or rank.
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• Also, since each individual appears twice in this merged distribution, we
can weigh the estimated statistics in the additive indices by half.
The expected proportional change in income of the poor (Q∗(p) < z) is then:
IGIC(p) = 0.5
[(∫
y2dΦ(y2|Q∗(p))
Q∗(p)
− 1
)
+
(
1−
∫
y1dΦ(y1|Q∗(p))
Q∗(p)
)]
= 0.5
[∫
y2dΦ(y2|Q∗(p))−
∫
y1dΦ(y1|Q∗(p))
]
upslopeQ∗(p) (19)
When the IGIC curve lies above the null horizontal line, we can conclude that the
proportion of individual that have an income of y = Q∗(p) < z and experience a
negative income movement is lower than that of those with a positive movement
of income. In such as case, we have a pro-poor income mobility (the case of a
predominant upward structural mobility), since the income of the poor is more
likely to increase in the long term.
3 Estimation and statistical inference
We use household data surveys to estimate distributive indices or curves. How-
ever, this type of data only covers a subset of the reference population. Even when
every effort is made to obtain a representative sample across the population, sam-
pling error still occurs. This forces us to deal with issues of estimation, sampling
variability and statistical inference. Indeed, an empirical difference in some sta-
tistical results between samples may not be strong enough to reach a statistically
significant conclusion. Although the importance of this point is increasingly well
understood in the literature on applied poverty measurement, it raises method-
ological issues that are not straightforward in the context of this paper. Namely,
we are presently interested in dominance tests over ranges of parameter values,
and in statistics that are non-linear functions of estimators estimated in different
(dependent or independent) samples. We consider these issues in turn.
3.1 Null and alternative hypotheses for testing pro-poorness of
growth
Verifying each of the conditions noted above in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 in-
volves testing whether ∆s(z) ≤ 0 or ∆s(p) ≥ 0 over some range of z or p. This
12
thus requires joint tests over a set of null hypotheses. For primal tests of pro-
poorness (tests which use estimators based on monetary thresholds z), our null
hypothesis is thus formed as a union of null hypotheses,
H0 : ∆
s(z) > 0 for some z ∈ [0, z+], (20)
to be tested against an alternative hypothesis that considers an intersection of
alternative hypotheses,
H1 : ∆
s(z) ≤ 0 for all z ∈ [0, z+]. (21)
For dual tests (those that use estimators based on percentiles p), we formulate
a union of null hypotheses,
H0 : ∆
s(p) < 0 for some p ∈ [0,F(z+)], (22)
to be tested against an intersection of alternative hypotheses,
H1 : ∆
s(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [0,F(z+)], (23)
where F(z+) is a function of z+. Our decision rule is to only reject the union
set of null hypotheses in favour of the intersection set of alternative hypotheses
if we can reject each of the individual hypotheses in the null set at a 100 · θ%
significance level. This can be conveniently done by calculating the 100 · (1 −
θ)% one-sided confidence intervals, an approach that we use repeatedly in the
empirical application below.
More specifically, let ∆ˆs(z) be the sample estimator of ∆s(z), let ∆s0(z) be its
sample value, and let σ2
∆ˆs(z)
be the sampling variance of ∆ˆs(z). Also, let ζ(θ) be
the (1 − θ)th quantile of the normal distribution. Given that, by the law of large
numbers and the central limit theorem, all of the estimators used in this paper
can be shown to be consistent and asymptotically normally distributed, we can
use ∆s0(z) + σ∆ˆs(z)ζ(θ) as the upper bound of a one-sided confidence interval for
∆s(z). A confidence interval with an upper bound of ∆s0(z) + σ∆ˆs(z)ζ(θ) shows
all values of η for which we cannot reject null hypothesis H0 : ∆s(z) > η in
favour of H1 : ∆s(z) ≤ η. Setting η = 0 (see (20) and (21)), our decision rule is
then to reject the set of null hypotheses (20) in favour of (21) if:
∆s0(z) + σ∆ˆs(z)ζ(θ) < 0 ∀z ∈ [0, z+]. (24)
For dual tests, we proceed with a similarly approach to (24), except that the
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signs in (22) and (23) are inverted. We thus obtain a confidence interval of ∆s0(p)−
σ∆ˆs(p)ζ(θ) and reject (22) in favour of (23) if
∆s0(p)− σ∆ˆs(p)ζ(θ) > 0 ∀p ∈ [0, F (z+)] (25)
for some distribution function F .
3.2 Estimation and sampling variability
We now need to define and assess ∆ˆs(z), ∆ˆs(p), σ∆ˆs(z) and σ∆ˆs(p). As we
will see, these statistics are non-linear functions of estimators that are estimated
across different (dependent or independent) samples, so estimating their sampling
variability involves difficulties that do not arise for simpler statistics (such as for
FGT indices with deterministic poverty lines).
Let Nj be a number of independently and identically distributed sample obser-
vations of incomes drawn from distribution j: y1j , ..., yNj . With f+ = max(f, 0), a
natural estimator of the FGT index Pj((1 + g)z;α) is given by
Pˆj((1 + gˆ)z;α) = N
−1
j
Nj∑
h=1
(
(1 + gˆ)z − yhj
(1 + gˆ)z
)α
+
(26)
where
1 + gˆ = µˆ2/µˆ1 (27)
and
µˆj = N
−1
j
Nj∑
h=1
yhj . (28)
The pth quantile Qj(p) is estimated as
Qˆj(p) = min
(
y
∣∣∣Fˆj(y) ≥ p) , (29)
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and the empirical distribution function is given by
Fˆj(y) = Pˆj(z; 0). (30)
Note that there are two sources of sampling variability in (26): the first comes
from the summation of random sample observations (assuming g is known),
Pˆj((1 + g)z;α) = N
−1
j
Nj∑
h=1
(
(1 + g)z − yhj
(1 + g)z
)α
+
, (31)
and the second comes from sampling variability in the estimator gˆ. A first-order
approximation to (26) yields
Pˆ2((1 + gˆ)z;α)− P2((1 + g)z;α) = Pˆ2((1 + g)z;α)− P2((1 + g)z;α)
+((1 + g)z)P gz2 ((1 + g)z;α)
(
µˆ2 − µ2
µ2
− µˆ1 − µ1
µ1
)
+o(N
−1/2
2 ) (32)
where
P gz2 ((1 + g)z;α) = α((1 + g)z)
−1 (P2((1 + g)z;α− 1)− P2((1 + g)z;α)) (33)
for α > 0 and
P gz2 ((1 + g)z; 0) = f2((1 + g)z) > 0 (34)
which is the density at (1 + g)z for α = 0. The P gz2 ((1 + g)z;α) terms are
constants that can be estimated from the samples and are proportional to the effect
of gˆ’s sampling variability on the sampling variability of Pˆ2((1 + gˆ)z;α). The
small order term o(N−1/22 ) decreases at a faster rate than N
1/2
2 .
Therefore, we can express ∆ˆs(z)−∆s(z) as
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∆ˆs(z)−∆s(z) = Aˆ− Bˆ + o(N−1/2) (35)
where
Aˆ =
(
Pˆ2((1 + g)z;α)− P2((1 + g)z;α)
)
+ ((1 + g)z)P gz2 ((1 + g)z;α)
(
µˆ2 − µ2
µ2
)
(36)
and
Bˆ =
(
Pˆ1(z;α)− P1(z;α)
)
− ((1 + g)z)P gz2 ((1 + g)z;α)
(
µˆ1 − µ1
µ1
)
. (37)
The small order term o(N−1/2j ) in (35) decreases faster than N1/21 and N1/22 ,
and Aˆ and Bˆ decrease as N1 and N2 increase towards infinity, so we can ignore it
asymptotically. By (27) and (31), Aˆ and Bˆ respectively in (36) and (37) are a sum
of independently and identically distributed (iid) sample observations.
Suppose that the two empirical distributions also come from independent sam-
ples, i.e., the selection of the sampling units is independent in each sample. With
N1 and N2 trending to infinity, we then have:
var
(
∆ˆs(z)−∆s(z)
) ∼= var(Aˆ)+ var(Bˆ) . (38)
If, however, the two samples are dependent because, for instance, they come
from the same panel data, then the asymptotic variance must be estimated jointly
over the two samples. We then have
var
(
∆ˆs(z)−∆s(z)
) ∼= var(Aˆ)+ var(Bˆ)− 2cov(Aˆ, Bˆ) . (39)
For the dual (or percentile) approach, first-order approximations of the sam-
pling distribution of the quantile estimator, Qˆ(p), and of its cumulative function
up to percentile p, Cˆ(p), are (omitting the subscript j) given by:
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Qˆ(p)−Q(p) = N−1
∑(
I[yh < Q(p)]− p)
f(Q(p))
+ o(N−1/2) (40)
and
Cˆ(p)− C(p) =
N−1
∑{(
I[yh < Q(p)]− p)Q(p) + yhI[yh < Q(p)]− C(p)}
+ o(N−1/2), (41)
where I[yh < Q(p)] is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if its argument
is true and 0 otherwise—see Bahadur (1966) and Davidson and Duclos (1997).
Again, we can asymptotically ignore the o(N−1/2) terms. The rest of the expres-
sions are sums of iid variables whose asymptotic sampling distribution can be
readily estimated using sample estimates.
4 Has growth in Andean economies been pro-poor
between 2005 and 2010?
4.1 The Peruvian case
4.1.1 The Peruvian data
There are two types of household surveys in Peru. The first is the National
Household Questionnaire Survey (ENAHO: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares) ad-
ministered by the National Institute of Statistics and Information (INEI: Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica e Informitica) . The second is the National Survey on Liv-
ing Standards (ENNIV: Encuesta Nacional sobre Niveles de Vida) administered
by the Instituto Cuanto. The ENAHO provides continuous annual data, while the
ENNIV provided its last data in 2000. Thus, for this study, we will use ENAHO, a
survey that began to be carried out in 1995 . Until 2002, this nationally represen-
tative survey was collected in the fourth quarter of the year in each of following
geographic domain: Urban Costa, Rural Costa, Urban Sierra, Rural Sierra, Ur-
ban Selva, Rural Selva and Metropolitan Lima. In May 2003, ENAHO became a
continuous survey that records information 52 weeks year. Starting in 2008, the
sample sizes of the ENAHO increased to more than 22 000 private homes and the
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sampling frame was updated using 2007 census information. It should be noted
here that ENAHO is a stratified and multistage sample. 10 In this study, we will
focus on the 2005-2010 period during which the 2008 world economic crisis oc-
curred, followed by a recovery period. In addition to the cross-sectional surveys,
we will also use a national representative Peruvian panel of 2,561 observations,
which covers 2007-2010. From 2007 to 2010, the same 2,561 households were
interviewed for each of the yearly surveys. Since the replacement process is ran-
dom, the sampled households continue to be representative and this process do
not introduce selection bias.
The monetary indicator of wellbeing is per capita consumption. The ENAHO
defines the poverty line as “a minimum expenditure deemed necessary for an in-
dividual in order to obtain all the goods and services which satisfy his or her basic
needs”. The total poverty line is the sum of food expenditures (an extreme poverty
line calculated on the basis of minimum daily caloric intake) and non-food expen-
ditures. In Peru, separate poverty lines are calculated for urban and rural areas
and for each region, such as the Costa (Coast), the Sierra (the Andes) and the
Selva (Jungle). According to INEI, the national monthly poverty line was 263.8
nuevos soles in 2010, while the extreme poverty line was 148.6 nuevos soles. To
standardize the monetary indicator of wellbeing, we use the 2010 national poverty
line as the reference poverty line. 11
4.1.2 Growth, poverty and inequality trends in Peru
Peru experienced remarkable economic performance between 2005 and 2010,
with an annual equivalent GDP growth rate of about 7.2%. This increase enabled
the population to raise their yearly per capita consumption by an average of 4.4%
per year during this period. However, as we can see in table PER-1, the annual
growth rate was not stable over time and was deeply disrupted by the economic
crisis of 2008/09. We can also observe that the poverty headcount decreased by
more than the third, from 48.7% in 2005 to 31.3% in 2010. Inequality decreased
substantially, with a fall in the Gini index from 0.379 to about 0.345 over this
period of time. Of course, growth may have a limited impact on poverty depend-
ing on the nature of change in the distribution. Thus, we begin by decomposing
the yearly change in poverty between growth and inequality components. The
10Strata are defined on the basis of the number of households in each town or locality. For
instance, the first strata includes localities with more than 100,000 housings.
11The standardization consists of multiplying the monetary indicator of wellbeing in region r in
time t by zrref ,tref /zr,t.
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approach that we adopt is that of Datt and Ravallion (1992), which was later im-
proved by Shorrocks (1999). As we can observe in figure PER-1, the combined
contribution of growth and inequality has ensured a significant yearly decrease in
poverty. For instance, the contribution of growth component in the first period
of the economic crisis (2007/08), was low compared to that of inequality. The
opposite case held in the two following years. For the change in the poverty gap,
the contribution of growth and inequality are similar to those for the headcount
(see figure PER-2). However, the size of the contribution of inequality may differ
significantly from one poverty index to another. Based on these preliminary re-
sults, it seems that Peruvian social programs effectively faced the adverse impacts
of the economic shocks on social welfare.
4.1.3 The pro-poorness of growth in Peru
In figure PER-3, we show the GIC curves and growth in average consumption.
As we can observe, our estimates show that the yearly growths were first order
absolutely pro-poor. This is because all GIC curves lie above the null horizontal
line for most of the distribution of the poor. Our estimates also show that yearly
growth for 2007/08 and 2009/10 were first order relatively pro-poor since the
GIC curves were higher than observed growth in average consumption. These
preliminary results provide a useful summary of the nature of pro-poorness in Peru
during the study period. However, as mentioned above, it is more appropriate to
verify that growth was pro-poor with the statistical robustness conditions.
Except for 2005/06 and 2008/09, figures PER-4 and PER-5 show that growth
was robustly first order absolutely pro-poor in each year. We arrive at the same
conclusion for the second order of dominance, as shown in figures PER-6 and
PER-7. Figures PER-8 and PER-9 show that, with the statistical robustness con-
dition, we cannot confirm for the first order relative pro-poor in Peru. However,
when we focus on an interim period, such as from 2007 to 2010 , we find that
growth was also first and second order relatively pro-poor, as shown in figures
PER-12 and PER-13. This finding indicates also that the results with respect to
pro-poorness can be sensitive to the length of the period being analyzed.
What can we conclude starting from these results? First, the absolutely pro-
poor growth was sufficient to ensure a significant decrease in poverty in each
year, as reported in table PER-1. For the 2007/08 period, the relatively pro-poor
growth contributed significantly to reduced poverty. First, we can conclude that
redistribution can be more effective at reducing poverty during periods of crisis
and is less so during periods of expansion. Second, we can confirm that the poor in
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Peru have continued to benefit from growth after the economic recovery through
the growth component.
As we have already explained, the impact of growth on poverty depends on
the sensitivity of the selected poverty index to growth as well as on the extent
of growth across the income distribution. Using the Kraay (2004) decomposition
approach, we show how the Kraay’s pro-poor components have contributed in the
evolution of poverty gap, in table PER-2 and figure PER-14. From these results,
we remark that:
• The observed low growth rate during the first period of the economic crisis
(2007/08) lowered the reduction in poverty gap;
• During the 2005/06 period, the redistributive component—the pattern of
growth across the income distribution—has an adverse and significant effect
on poverty reduction;
• The estimated values of the Kraay’s pro-poor components are similar to
those derived using the Datt and Ravallion (1992) approach, as we can ob-
serve by comparing the results of figure PER-2 with those reported in table
PER-2.
Now, we will return to results of our proposed decomposition of changes in
poverty into pro-poor components, as shown in equation 14 and as reported in
table PER-3 and figure PER-15. In general, we find that growth among the poor is
lower than among the entire population but is more stable over time. The absolute
covariance between the sensitivity of poverty to growth and growth itself —shown
in the last column of the table — has continued to be substantially high in 2008/09
and increased during the 2009/10 recovery period, which indicate an improvement
in the distribution of the benefits of growth within the poor.
4.1.4 The non-anonymous pro-poorness of growth and mobility in Peru
As we discussed above, we are interested in pro-poor growth in order to study
the connection between growth and poverty. Also, we can recognize that income
growth in part reflects the dynamic of income. Looking at growth through use of
the non-anonymous principle may add valuable information about income mobil-
ity and how it interacts with the poverty over time. In figure PER-16, we present
the non-anonymous GIC curves when the period of reference to define the poor
group is the initial. As we can see in this figure, we find that growth was first
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order non-anonymous pro-poor for all periods between 2007 and 2010. However,
when the period of reference to define the poor group is the final period, growth
does not appear to be pro-poor (see the figure PER-17). In general, this result is
expected and it is more plausible that those who are more poor in the final period
are those who are vulnerable to poverty but are not poor in the initial period (indi-
cating downward mobility). To remove the arbitrariness of selecting the reference
period to define the poor, we also present intertemporal pro-poor growth in order
to focus on changes of incomes of the poor in general. As we can observe in figure
PER-18, the poor experienced an increase in income over time. This is consistent
with the ongoing decrease in poverty during the studied period.
Among the popular indices to quantify mobility is that of Shorrocks (1978),
based on the information of the diagonal of the transition matrix. Formally, the
index equals M = [g − trace(Z)]/(g − 1), where g is the number of partitions
of the population and Z is the transition matrix. Typically, the normalized index
by g/(g − 1) indicates the percentage of movers by quintile or decile (see tables
PER-4 and PER-5). In table PER-6, we present some mobility statistics from the
transition matrix by decile. As we can observe, mobility increased during the
2008/09 crisis period, during which 26.1% stayed in the same decile. We also
show that, for the 2007/10 period as a whole, mobility was higher than when
shorter periods are considered (yearly mobility). For those with incomes equal
to or less than the median (p < 0.5)), we observe that a greater percentage saw
their income increase rather than decrease. This is consistent earlier results that
showed significant improvements in the welfare of the poor over time.
4.2 The Ecuadorian case
4.2.1 The Ecuadorian data
The National Institute of Statistics and Census INEC produces quarterly data
for the most important socioeconomic variables, such as employment, unemploy-
ment, underemployment and other demographic information relating to education,
internal migration and household incomes. The Integrated Household Survey—
SIEH—is a basic strategic planning tool to produce demographic and economic
statistics. Under the SIEH , there was also the National Surveys of Employment,
Unemployment and Underemployment, (ENEDMU: Encuseta Nacional de Em-
pleo, Desempleo y Subempleo). The ENEMDU urban geographic areas corre-
spond to the five major cities (Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca, Machala and Ambato),
Rest of Urban Sierra, Rural Sierra, Other Urban Costa, Rural Costa, Urban Ama-
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zon, Rural Amazon. . The ENEMDU survey follows a stratified design with three
stages (UPM, census zone and household) where the primary sampling unit is re-
ferred to as UPM (Unidades Primaria du Muestreo). In the second stage, one
census zone is selected within each UPM, and in the third stage, a pre-determined
number of dwellings are selected. The UPM’s are chosen with a probability pro-
portional to size sampling. The sampling unit is a dwelling or housing structure,
and information regarding the household or households occupying each dwelling
is collected. The survey covers a wide range of economic and socio-demographic
information such as: the labour force, different sources of income, housing, mi-
gration, education and other social indicators. Between approximately 13,900 and
20,400 households were surveyed each December between 2000 and 2010. To be
noted here that (expansion factor) provided by the INEC are used in order to take
into account to optimize the national representativeness of the sample.
To study the pro-poorness of growth in Ecuador, we use the 2005-2010 EN-
EMDU surveys. Per capita income is considered as the monetary indicator of
wellbeing for the Ecuadorian population. The poverty and extreme poverty lines
are based on the official poverty line, updated using the CPI. This poverty line was
calculated using the Living Conditions Survey of 2006 (ECV2, 5th round). The
official poverty line was $57.29 US per capita per month in 2006, and $69.05 US
per capita per month in 2010.
4.2.2 Growth, poverty and inequality trends in Ecuador
Between 2005 and 2010, Ecuador has registered an average GDP of about
3.2%. During the same period, the average growth rate of per capita income, esti-
mated using microdata, was about 2.1%. The GDP and per capita income growth
trends show the deep impact of the 2008 world economic crisis on the Ecuadorian
economy. Indeed, GDP growth fell from 6.5% in 2008 to 0.4% in 2009. Fur-
thermore, the results show an abrupt decline in per capita income of about 5.8%
during the 2007/08 period (see table ECU-1). In the 2009/10 period, the Ecuado-
rian economy recovered somewhat, to grow by about 3.2% in 2010. Examining
the poverty trend presented in table ECU-1, we can see that the headcount de-
creased by about 10% between 2005 and 2010. This decline mostly occurred in
the 2005/06 and 2009/10 periods, outside the time of the world economic cri-
sis. However, the decrease in inequality as measured by the Gini index was more
pronounced during the 2007/08 period. The trends of the impact of growth and
changes in inequality on poverty are shown in figures ECU-1 and ECU-2. In
general, these figures show the expected negative correlation between growth and
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poverty. This also explains the contribution of negative growth to greater poverty
in 2007/08 and 2008/09. However, the inequality component lightened the impact
of negative growth on poverty during these periods, allowing Ecuador to never-
theless have an appreciable decrease in poverty throughout the period , except in
2008/09.
4.2.3 The pro-poorness of growth in Ecuador
In figure ECU-3, we show the GIC curves and growth in per capita income.
Without considering statistical robustness, growth was absolutely pro-poor in
2005/06, 2007/08 and 2009/10. Generally speaking, growth was also relatively
pro-poor with the exceptions of 2006/07 and 2009/10. When considering the
2005/10 period as a whole, growth was both absolutely and relatively pro-poor.
How can we reviewing our perception to the absolute and relative approaches
starting from Ecuadorian experience? Let us focus on the outcomes in 2008/09
and 2009/10. In 2008/09, growth was relatively but not absolutely pro-poor, even
though poverty increased during this period. This surprising finding may raise
questions with regard to the relative approach. Indeed, during crisis periods, the
relative approach simply focuses on the change in inequality rather than that of
poverty. In 2009/10, economic growth in Ecuador was nearly inequality-neutral, a
case where all incomes increase by the same proportion. This clearly helps reduce
poverty but not inequality. This also renders the observed growth absolutely but
not relatively pro-poor. Can we conclude that the growth of 2008/09 was better
for the poor than that of 2009/10? In general, it should not be difficult to agree
that any distributive change that reduces poverty will be welcomed by the poor.
We will now review the types of pro-poor growth in Ecuador, considering
statistical robustness. For the 2005/06 and 2009/10 periods, figures ECU-4 and
ECU-5 show that growth was first order absolutely pro-poor. Furthermore, for
2005/10 as a whole, figure ECU-12 shows that growth was also first order abso-
lutely pro-poor. For the second order of dominance, figures ECU-6 and ECU-7
show that growth was absolutely pro-poor in the 2005/06, 2007/8 and 2009/10
periods. For the relative approach, figures ECU-8 and ECU-9 show that growth
was relatively first order pro-poor in 2007/08 and 2008/09. The same results were
also found when considering the second order of dominance,as shown in figures
ECU-10 and ECU-11. Additionally, we find that for 2005/10 as a whole, growth
was first order relatively pro-poor (see figure ECU-13).
Next, we return to Kraay (2004)’s decomposition in order to understand how
growth, and its pattern relative to income, has affected poverty (see the results
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of table ECU-2). First, we note that the sensitivity of poverty to growth re-
mained stable during the period being studied. Thus, the main contribution of the
product of average income growth and sensitivity to growth (C1C2) was driven
by the level of growth in average income. Similar to what we found with the
Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition, the results show again that the redis-
tributive impact, captured by the patter of growth in relative income component,
contributed to poverty reductions during the periods of negative economic growth.
Now, we turn to results of the proposed decomposition of changes in poverty
into pro-poor components, as shown in table ECU-3. Mainly, we find that for the
two periods where the decrease in poverty was substantial (2005/06 and 2009/10),
the correlation between the sensitivity to growth (η(p)) and the growth (g(p)) was
high and thus that relative changes in income contributed to reduced poverty.
What lessons can we draw from the Ecuadorian experience?
• During periods of crisis (negative growth), it is socially desirable to have
positive income growth among the poor (an absolute view);
• If the condition of absolute pro-poorness is not satisfied during periods of
crisis (negative growth), it is socially desirable for the poor to be affected
less than the rich (a relative view);
• During periods of expansion (positive growth), it is socially desirable for
the poor to benefit more from growth (a relative view);
• If the relative pro-poorness condition is not satisfied during periods of ex-
pansion, it is socially desirable for the poor to continue to register positive
income growth (an absolute view);
However, we must recall the ambiguity surrounding comparisons between the
results of the absolute and relative approaches. To untangle this ambiguity, let us
return to the reason for considering the relative form of pro-poorness. In general,
the idea pertains to the conditions required to avoid inequality trap. Especially
in countries with greater poverty and inequality, relatively higher growth among
the poor is required to substantially reduce poverty. For these countries, low ab-
solute pro-poorness may keep the poor group in their situation for a long time.
Unfortunately, this narrow view cannot be generalized across countries at differ-
ent stages of development. Indeed, many emerging economies have succeeded in
substantially reducing poverty but have seen inequality persist or even increase.
The debate about the relevance of the different conditions of pro-poorness may
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continue. However, the pro-poorness of growth can evaluated in specific contexts,
with the nature of growth and the level of the country’s wealth potentially impact-
ing our outlook on the pro-poorness of growth.
4.3 The Bolivian case
4.3.1 The Bolivian data
The National Institute of Statistics conducted several rounds of household sur-
veys, and the first of these took place in 1978. These surveys include the Perma-
nent Household Survey (EPH), the Integrated Household Survey (IHS) and the
National Employment Survey.
In 1999, a World Bank initiative began in the region by implementing the Liv-
ing Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) that aim to collect information on
the living conditions of the Bolivian population in order to produce poverty in-
dicators and to support policies and programs that improve the welfare of house-
holds. The first data collected in the country in the framework of the LSMS was
gathered in November of 1999. From 1999-2002, Bolivia’s National Institute of
Statistics carried out a household survey as part of the Program for the Improve-
ment of Surveys and the Measurement of Living Conditions in Latin America and
the Caribbean (MECOVI). The Continuing Survey of Households, similar to a
household budget survey, ran between 2003 and 2004. It preserves the traditional
content of the survey, with an emphasis on household income and expenditures.
Starting from 2005, the surveys returned to the form of specific homes with the
implementation of the Household Survey, which continued to explore the living
conditions of the Bolivian population through multi-thematic surveys that make it
possible to investigate general household characteristics. The Encuesta de Hog-
ares (EH) allows multi-thematic research relating to: sociodemographic charac-
teristics, health, education, employment, income and expenditures of household
members, and the characteristics of housing and household utilities, in order to
generate poverty indicators. This makes it possible to design, evaluate and mon-
itor policies and to design social action programs with a view to improving the
welfare of households. In this study, we use the 2005-2009 EH surveys. These
samples are stratified and clustered with unequal probability weights and contain
data on about 4000 surveyed household. Per capita income is the monetary indi-
cator of wellbeing that is adopted. In Bolivia, the official poverty line varies by
department and among urban and rural areas to account for price differences. For
2009, we estimate the weighted average monthly poverty line across the depart-
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ments of Bolivia to be about 549.51 Bolivianos (BOB). We use this as a reference
poverty line to perform the temporal and spatial standardization.
4.3.2 Growth, poverty and inequality trends in Bolivia
Between 2005 and 2009, Bolivia registered an average annual GDP growth of
about 4.6%. This significant increase in GDP did not translate into a similar trend
for per capita income, as estimated from microdata, which declined by an average
of about -1.5% during the same period. As shown in table BOL-1, the trend of
per capita income shows the deep impact of world economic crisis of 2008 on
the wellbeing of the Bolivian population, with an 8.5% fall in average per capita
income between 2007 and 2008. An impressive recovery followed this negative
result and average per capita income increased by about 5.1%. Looking at poverty
trends, we can see that the two significant decreases in the poverty headcount
and poverty occurred during the 2007/08 and 2008/9 periods. Similarly, we note
that inequality also decreased significantly during these two periods. The impacts
of growth and inequality on poverty are shown in figures BOL-1 and BOL-2.
These figures mainly show that inequality lightened the negative impact of growth
during crisis periods. We can also note the low contribution of the redistribution
(inequality) component during the 2008/09 period.
4.3.3 The pro-poorness of growth in Bolivia
In figure BOL-3, we show the GIC curves and growth in average per capita in-
come. Without considering statistical robustness, growth was absolutely pro-poor
for the extremely poor in 2005/06 and was absolutely pro-poor in 2007/08. We
reach the same conclusion with respect to relative pro-poorness. For the entire
study period of 2005-2009, growth was absolutely and relatively pro-poor. Note
that for the 2008/09 period, the GIC curve beyond the 10th percentile was sig-
nificantly higher than zero. We can thus generally consider growth to have been
pro-poor in this period if the function used to evaluate social welfare of poverty
does not depend mainly on the wellbeing of the first decile. We now review the
nature of pro-poor growth in Bolivia in consideration of statistical robustness.
Figures BOL-4 and BOL-5 show that growth was only first order absolutely pro-
poor when considering the entire study period (2005/09) as a whole. However, we
can conclude that growth was second order absolutely pro-poor for the 2007/08,
2008/09 and 2005/09 periods (see figures BOL-6 and BOL-7). When consider-
ing relative pro-poorness, figures BOL-12 and BOL-14 show that the growth was
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both first and second order pro-poor in the 2007/08 and 2005/09 periods. Now, we
return to Kraay (2004)’s decomposition in order to understand how growth and its
pattern has affected the poverty gap. In 2005/06, the change in poverty and in
the different components were insignificant (see table BOL-2). During 2006/07,
the negative impact of average income growth (C1C2) was largely balanced by
the pro-poor pattern of growth (C3). This was also the case for 2007/08. As re-
ported earlier, the poverty reduction between 2008 and 2009 largely resulted from
growth in average income (C1C2), where the contribution of the redistributive
factor (C3) was practically nil. The results of the decomposition of changes in
poverty into pro-poor components are also reported in table BOL-3. For 2005/06,
the change in poverty would have been 2.3% (C1C2) if the benefits of growth
were equally distributed. Otherwise, we can conclude for the negative impact of
the within poor-group inequality (C3). For the remaining periods, and especially
for 2008/09, we find that both average growth (C1C2) and the distribution of
growth among the poor (C3) have the effect of reducing poverty. In summary,
for the Bolivian case, we can conclude that growth was both relatively and ab-
solutely pro-poor during the 2005/09 period. The world economic crisis deeply
impacted the wellbeing of the Bolivian population in 2008. This effect was sig-
nificantly lightened by the redistribution (inequality) factor and was followed by
a remarkable period of recovery (2008/09).
4.4 The venezuelan case
4.4.1 The venezuelan data
The Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo (EHM) is the national household sur-
vey in Venezuela, conducted by the National Statistics Institute (INE: El Instituto
Nacional de Estadı´sticas). The survey is conducted since 1967, two times per
year and the period of data collection is 6 months. The main objective of this sur-
vey is to provide general information on socioeconomic and sociodemographics
characteristics of the labor force. The EHM survey is stratified with a multistage
sampling design. The primary sampling units are the lots, which represents a geo-
graphical areas of about 15 houses. For the used data in our study (2005 to 2010),
the sampling frame is composed of the Master Sample based on the National Pop-
ulation Census of 2001. The total number of lots in the sample of 2005 is 3036,
equivalent to 45,000 homes, approximately. The surveys of the second semester
for each of the yeas from 2005 to 2010 was used in our study. Further, we use
the per capita income as the monetary indicator of wellbeing. The official poverty
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line varies spatially to account for price differences. The daily national poverty
line was about 520 Bolivar fuerte (VEF) in 2010. We use this level as a reference
poverty line to perform the temporal and spatial standardizations.
4.4.2 The trend of growth, poverty and inequality in Venezuela
Between 2005 and 2010, Venezuela has registered an annual equivalent GDP
of about 3.5%. During the same period, the average growth rate of per capita
income, estimated using microdata, was about 1.9%. The GDP and per capita
income growth trends show the deep impact of the economic crisis on the period
of 2008 until 2010. Indeed, the GDP growth was negative for the years of 2009
and 2010 with a levels of -3.3% and -1.9% respectively. As shown also in table
VEN-1, there has been a significant decline in the per capita income for the years
of 2009 and 2010. Examining the poverty trend presented, we can see that the
headcount decreased sharply between the years of 2005 and 2007. The level of
headcount has practically remained constant after this period. Thus, the main
decline in the whole studied period mostly occurred outside the time of the world
economic crisis. However, the decrease in inequality as measured by the Gini
index was more pronounced during the 2005/06 and 2008/10 periods. The trends
of the impact of growth and changes in inequality on poverty are shown in figures
VEN-1 and VEN-2. Mainly, we conclude for the importance of the inequality
component to lighten the impact of negative growth on poverty during the periods
of crisis, as is the case for the years of 2009 and 2010.
4.4.3 The pro-poorness of growth in Venezuela
In figure VEN-3, we show the GIC curves and growth in per capita income.
Without considering statistical robustness, growth was absolutely pro-poor in
2005/06 and 2006/07. Generally speaking, growth was also relatively pro-poor
with the exceptions of 2007/08. When considering the 2005/10 period as a whole,
growth was both absolutely and relatively pro-poor. As was discussed for the
case of other countries, like the Ecuador for instance, the relative pro-poorness is
checked easily during the recession periods.
We will now review the types of pro-poor growth in Venezuela, considering
statistical robustness. For the 2005/06 and 2006/07 periods, figures VEN-4 and
VEN-5 show that growth was first order absolutely pro-poor. Furthermore, for
2005/10 as a whole, figure VEN-12 shows that growth was also first order abso-
lutely pro-poor. For the second order of dominance, figures VEN-6 and VEN-7
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show that growth was absolutely pro-poor in the 2005/06, 2006/07 and 2008/09
periods. For the relative approach, figures VEN-8 and VEN-9 show that growth
was relatively first order pro-poor in 2005/06, 2008/09 and 2009/10. For relative
second order of dominance,as shown in figures VEN-10 and VEN-11 the domi-
nance is checked for all periods, except for the period of 2007/08. Additionally,
we find that for 2005/10 as a whole, growth was first order relatively pro-poor (see
figure VEN-13).
In table VEN-2 we show the results of the Kraay (2004)’s decomposition in
order to understand how growth, and its pattern relative to income, has affected
poverty. First, we note that the sensitivity of poverty to growth was relatively
higher in 2007/08. however, its level was practically stable for the rest of periods
and the main contribution of the product of average income growth and sensitivity
to growth (C1C2) was driven by the level of growth in average income. Similar
to what we found with the Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition, the results
show again that the redistributive impact, captured by the patter of growth in rela-
tive income component, have contributed to poverty reductions during the periods
of negative economic growth.
Now, we turn to the results of the proposed decomposition of changes in
poverty into pro-poor components (see the table VEN-3). Mainly, we find a nega-
tive impact of the redistribution in 2008/09 and a positive effect for the following
period. To understand, better why this was the case for the period of 2008/09, let
us reviewing the GIC curve in figure VEN-3. As we can remark, for the period of
2008/09, the growth was important among the poorest of poor group. Thus, this
reduction in inequality that occur mainly within the poor will not help in reducing
the poverty gap index.
4.5 The Colombian case
4.5.1 The Colombian data
The National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) implemented
the (ENH) quarterly National Household Survey from 1976 to 1999. The main
aim this survey was to assess the evolvement of employment, unemployment and
to measure changes in levels of other variables related to the populations labor
force. This survey was replaced in 2000 by the yearly Continuous Household
Survey (ECH). To avoid the seasonality effect, this survey allows to estimate the
average weekly indicators of the labor force for a given period. The ECH survey is
stratified with multi-staged sampling and self-weighted for the 13 cities and their
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metropolitan areas (Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Maniza-
les, Pasto, Pereira, Cucuta, Ibague, Monteria, Cartagena y Villavicencio). The
sampling frame consists of the cartographic inventory and listings of dwellings
by city from the Population and Housing National Census of 1993. For the year
of 2004, the sample size in each quarter corresponds to 50,850 households in the
thirteen cities and 12,510 households in other domains of study. In our study, we
use the validated data for the years of 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2010. The per
capita income is the monetary indicator of wellbeing that is adopted. The offi-
cial poverty line varies spatially to account for price differences. The estimated
weighted yearly average poverty line in 2010 was about 187048.42 pesos colom-
bians. We use this level as a reference poverty line to perform the temporal and
spatial standardization.
4.5.2 The trend of growth, poverty and inequality in Colombia
Between 2004 and 2010, Colombia has registered an average annual GDP of
about 5.5%. During the same period, the average growth rate of per capita income,
estimated using microdata, was about 4.1%. The trend of GDP shows the deep
impact of the economic crisis on the period of 2008 until 2010. Mainly the GDP
has decreased from 8.2% in 2007 to 2.5% in 2008, then to 0.8% in 2009. The
increase in GDP to 4.3% 2010 marks the start of recovery period. As shown also
in table COL-1, the variation in average per capita has grown during all the studied
periods. However, the yearly variation has decreased in 2008/2009. As we can
observe also, the headcount has decreased by about 10% between 2004 and 2010,
while the poverty gap has decreased by the quarter. The inequality as measured
by the Gini index was remained practically with a level of about 0.53. The trends
of the impact of growth and changes in inequality on poverty are shown in figures
COL-1 and COL-2. In general, we observe that inequality increases slightly the
poverty indices during the expansion periods. Further, we find that growth was
enough to ensure the significant and continues reduction in poverty, except during
the crisis period of 2008/09.
4.5.3 The pro-poorness of growth in Colombia
In figure COL-3, we show the GIC curves and growth in average per capita
income. Without considering statistical robustness, growth was absolutely pro-
poor in 2004/05, 2008/09 and 2009/10. Further, growth was also relatively pro-
poor in 2008/09. When considering the 2004/10 period as a whole, growth was
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both absolutely and relatively pro-poor.
By considering the statistical robustness condition, we find that growth was
first order absolutely pro-poor for the 2004/05, 2008/09 and 2009/10 periods (see
figures COL-4 and COL-5). Furthermore, for 2005/10 as a whole, figure COL-12
shows that growth was also first order absolutely pro-poor. For the second order of
absolute pro-poorness, we find similar results to those of the first order, shown in
figures COL-6 and COL-7. For the relative approach, figures COL-8 and COL-9
show that growth was relatively first order pro-poor only for the period of 2008/09.
This was also the case for the second order of dominance, as shown in figures
COL-10 and COL-11. Also, we find that for 2005/10 as a whole, growth was first
order relatively pro-poor (see figure COL-13).
Now, we return to Kraay (2004)’s decomposition in order to show how growth,
and its pattern relative to income, has affected poverty (see the results of table
COL-2). First, we note that the component pattern of growth in relative income
increases in general the poverty except during the period of 2008/09. We remark
also that the sensitivity of poverty to growth is low for the period of 2005/08.
Thus, the main contribution of the product of average income growth and sen-
sitivity to growth (C1C2) was driven by the level of growth in average income.
Similar to what we found with the Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposition, the
redistributive impact, captured by the pattern of growth in relative income com-
ponent, have contributed to poverty reductions during the periods of negative eco-
nomic growth.
Now, we turn to results of the proposed decomposition of changes in poverty
into pro-poor components, as shown in table ECU-3. Mainly, we find that, for the
two periods where the decrease in poverty was substantial (2005/06 and 2009/10),
the correlation between the sensitivity to growth (η(p)) and the growth (g(p)) was
high, and thus, that the relative changes in income contributed in reducing poverty.
5 A comparative analysis of pro-poorness of growth
in the L.A. Andean countries
In this section, we try to draw a general picture on the nature of pro-poorness
of growth in the L.A. Andean countries between 2005 and 2010. As already dis-
cussed, during this period, an appreciable economic performance was observed
at the beginning of the studied period. However, this period was followed by
the 2008 economic crisis. Our aim is to synthesize the results of pro-poorness
31
of growths in order to show the similarities and dissimilarities across the studied
countries, and then we try to explain them.
5.1 The trend of growth, poverty and inequality
As we can observe in figures LAA-1 and LAA-2, the studied period can be
subdivided into three phases. The first phase, between 2005 and 2007, was fea-
tured by a remarkable economic growth in the L.A. Andean countries, except for
Bolivia. This phase was followed by 2008 world economic crisis. To be noted here
that the impact of this crisis did not occur at the same time in all countries. For
instance, while Ecuador registered the economic downturn in 2007/08, Venezuela
experienced the crisis in 2008/09. Of course, the nature and level of dependance of
the economy of each country with that of the rest of world will determine the du-
ration and amplitude of the impact. After the second phase of the economic crisis,
a third phase characterized by some economic recovery has followed. However,
the exception was Venezuela, and where the domestic product and the average per
capita continue to register negative growth rates, and this, even in 2009/10 period.
Now we turn to review the trend of poverty, measured by the headcount (see
the figure LAA-3). In general, we observe that poverty in L.A. Andean coun-
tries follows a decreasing trend. However, the speed of this decrease varies across
countries and periods. It is clear that the 2008 world economic crisis has slowed
down the decrease of poverty. Further, we observe that the speeds of decrease
in Peru and Ecuador were high compared to the rest of the countries. This has
enabled them to reach the lowest levels of poverty observed in Venezuela. Fur-
ther, we note that Bolivia and Colombia continue to display the highest levels of
poverty.
Inequality is high in most of the L.A. Andean countries (see the figure LAA-4).
Inversely to poverty, the speed of decrease in inequality is relatively low. This may
be explained by the nature of increase in the disparities during the boom economic
periods, and where some sectors perform better than others. Inversely, these dis-
parities have the tendency of decrease during the recession periods. This finding
can be explained mainly by two facts. The first is the high decrease in returns of
those with high physical and human capital. The second is the generous social
packages that can target well the poor and, consequently, lighten the reduction in
their income.
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5.2 The absolute and relative pro-poorness of growth in LA
countries
Tables LAA-1 and LAA-2 summarize the results found for the first and sec-
ond order of dominance of absolute and relative pro-poorness of growth in the
L.A. Andean countries. In these two tables, the cell is marked only if the domi-
nance condition is checked with the statistical robustness. Except for Ecuador, we
generally find that growth was relatively pro-poor during the economic crisis pe-
riod (2007/08 and 2008/09). Inversely, growth was in general absolutely pro-poor
during the boom and recovery economic periods. Based on this, it seems that the
relative pro-poor measurements are the good indicator during the crisis periods in
order to check whether the impact is relatively low for the poor. This may be the
case where the governmental programs are intense and target well the poor during
the economic crisis period. However, the absolute pro-poor measurements can be
useful to check whether the poor benefits sufficiently during the boom economic
periods to escape poverty.
6 Lessons and conclusions
This paper is devoted to study the pro-poorness of growth in the Latino Amer-
ican Andean countries for the 2005/10 period. It is worth noting that this period
was marked by different events, which have largely affected the distribution of
wealth in this region. Indeed, at the beginning of the studied period, these coun-
tries have registered in general an appreciable economic performance. However,
this performance was followed by the 2008 world economic crisis, followed in
its turn by a period of economic recovery. Our main aim was to check whether
growth during the pre and post-shock periods was pro-poor as well as to highlight
the distribution of the burden of the economic crisis.
Of course, fighting against poverty, helping the inclusion of the poor group
into the economic activity sphere and improving the social wellbeing in general,
continue to be the primordial objectives of social planners and policymakers. Two
main factors can help the improvement of wellbeing of deprived group: the eco-
nomic growth and the equitable distribution of wealth. Even if economists can
agree for the potential impact of each of the two factors on poverty, they have
not a consensus about the importance of each of them. Mainly, the pro-poor real-
ization can be seen from different angles. The first focuses on the importance of
absolute impact of growth without considering the distribution of benefits. This
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view is in concordance with the Pareto optimum principle; in such case poor and
non-poor groups may benefit largely in absolute terms. The second focuses on
the importance of the relative impact of growth on poverty without considering
the absolute level of change. This view is defended by the possibility of low im-
pact of growth on poverty in the case of high inequality. Unfortunately, each of
the two approaches emerging from these views may contain some weakness, and
this, depending on the studied case. Beside the debate surrounding the importance
of each of these two fundamental factors, which are growth and inequality, that
reshape the distribution of wellbeing, other preoccupations emerge when the dy-
namic nature of pro-poor analysis is considered. Among these aspects, we find
the importance of considering the non-anonymity principle in order to focus on
assessing the wellbeing of the same unit of analysis -the individual for instance-.
The other aspect concerns the choice of period of the definition of poor group. To
be noted here that this work contains a developed theoretical framework in order
to analyze pro-poor growth in a dynamic manner, and where we consider the poor
in the initial and final periods.
The results of pro-poorness of growth for the peruvian case show that growth
was in general yearly absolutely pro-poor and was relatively pro-poor when we
consider the 2007/10 period. The peruvian experience shows also that even if
growth was not yearly relatively pro-poor, this country shows the highest de-
crease in poverty within this short period, with about a third of decrease. This
fact raises the question about the importance of considering the relative criteria
of pro-poorness. It is worth noting that the Peru has been affected by the 2008
world economic crisis. However, the impact on poor was largely lightened by the
redistribution component. This indicates the effectiveness of the social packages
to support the poor during this period of crisis. In this paper, some theoretical
developments and a set of results were carried out for the peruvian case in order
to show the linkage between the income mobility, the pro-poor growth as well as
the inter-temporal wellbeing of the poor group. The statistics summarized starting
from transition matrices show that Peru has registered a net yearly upward income
mobility, and this, especially for those with incomes below the median. This find-
ing is confirmed also by the inter-temporal pro-poor growth results and where
the situation of poor group, defined in initial and final periods, has registered a
significant improvement.
For the Ecuadorian case, poverty has decreased in general significantly during
the studied period (the headcount has decreased by about 10%). Further, we find
that growth was yearly absolutely pro-poor for the 2005/06 and 2009/10 periods,
and yearly relatively pro-poor for the 2005/06, 2007/8 and 2009/10 periods. How-
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ever, even if growth was relatively pro-poor in 2007/08, the country registered a
significant increase in poverty within the same period. This raises again the ques-
tion about the pertinence of using the relative approach. Mainly, during the crisis
periods, this approach seems to focus only on the nature of change in inequality
rather than that in poverty.
Now we focus on the Bolivian experience, which is covered for the period
between 2005 and 2009. This country continues to register the highest poverty
rates and where about 60% of the population are stated to be poor in 2005. The
important decrease in poverty in this country occurred within the recovery period
in 2008/09, and where the headcount decreased by about 6%. Growth was sec-
ond order absolutely pro-poor for the 2007/08 and 2008/09 periods and relatively
pro-poor growth in the 2007/08 period. Further, growth was absolutely and rel-
atively pro-poor when considering the entire study period as a whole. Starting
from the Bolivian experience, we discover how the statistical robustness condi-
tions may induce to some doubt with regards to the empirical results found in
other works on the pro-poorness of growth. Indeed, in many cases, we remark
that the pro-poorness conditions are checked, but when we add the statistical ro-
bustness condition, the results of pro-poorness begin non significant. The world
economic crisis deeply impacted the wellbeing of the Bolivian population in 2008.
This effect was significantly lightened by the redistribution (inequality) factor, and
further by a remarkable period of recovery (2008/09).
From the Venezuelan case, covered for the 2005/10 period, we learned that the
timing and duration of the impact of the 2008 world economic crisis differ from
one country to another. Especially, for Venezuela, the impact of the crisis started in
2009 and continued in 2010, with GDP of -3.3% in 2009 and -1.9% in 2010. The
headcount has decreased sharply between 2005 and 2007, but remaind constant
after this period. For this country, we find also that growth was yearly absolutely
pro-poor for the 2005/06 and 2006/07 periods, and yearly relatively pro-poor for
the 2005/06, 2008/09 and 2009/10 periods. As we can remark, we have again a
case where growth was relatively pro-poor in 2009/10 without decrease in poverty.
Results found for the Columbian country have some similarities with the oth-
ers. This country has registered a remarkable decrease in headcount by about 10%.
This significant decrease in poverty occurred even if the inequality remained high
(0.53 in 2010). In this country, we find also that growth was yearly absolutely for
the 2004/05, 2008/09 and 2009/10 periods and was relatively first order pro-poor
only for the period of 2008/09. Also, we find that for 2005/10 as a whole, growth
was absolutely and relatively pro-poor.
By comparing the different results of the studied L.A. Andean countries, we
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find that growth was relatively pro-poor during the crisis periods (2007/08 and
2008/09). Inversely, growth was is in general absolutely pro-poor during the boom
and recovery economic periods. Starting from this, we can conclude that the rela-
tive pro-poor measurements can be good indicators during the crisis periods. This
can help to check whether the economic crises affect relatively more the non-poor.
This can be the case when the social governmental programs are intense and target
well the poor group. In an another part, we can consider that the absolute pro-poor
measurements are useful indicators in order to check whether the poor benefit suf-
ficiently from growth during the boom economic periods to escape poverty. The
salient fact was about the dynamic of inequality in the Andean L.A. countries.
Mainly, we find that the 2008 world economic crisis has contributed in the sharp
and significant decrease in inequality. Obviously, this is the case when the im-
pact of the economic crisis is relatively more supported by the non-poor group. In
such case, we observe also a relative pro-poor growth. More important, our re-
sults show that this decrease in inequality has remained even during the recovery
period.
Finally, note that the lessons drawn from the study of pro-poorness of growth
in the different L.A. andean countries as well as the discussion about the inter-
temporal pro-poor growth will contribute to aliment the discussion about the con-
cept of pro-poor of growth. This can in its turn inspire future works in order to
investigate better on the concept of pro-poor growth and how the latter is linked
with other issues of the distributive analysis.
36
The Peruvian results
Table PER-1: Trend of average per capita consumption, poverty and inequality: Peru 2005/10
Year Average Yearly Variation Headcount Yearly Poverty Yearly Gini Yearly
consumption variation variation gap variation index variation
2005 351.5 — 48.7 — 16.6 — 0.3789
2006 377.0 25.6 (2005/07) 44.5 -4.18** 15.1 -1.52* 0.3852 0.0063
2007 403.9 26.9 52.5*** 39.3 -5.23*** 12.8 -2.30*** 0.3786 -0.0066
2008 406.4 2.5 36.2 -3.10** 11.1 -1.68** 0.3533 -0.0253*
2009 422.9 16.5 (2007/10) 34.8 -1.42 10.1 -0.95 0.3582 0.0049
2010 436.1 13.1 32.1** 31.3 -3.45** 8.8 -1.38** 0.3448 -0.0133
Sampling design is fully taken into account in computing the standard errors.
∗p ≤ 0.10, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.38
Table PER-2: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth components
Kraay (2004) approach - Peru 2005/10
Poverty C1: Average C2: Sensitivity C1C2 C3: Pattern of growth in relative incomes
Period Change growth to growth Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(∆P (α = 1)) (g) (∫ η(p)) Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
2005/06 -0.0152 0.0728 -0.2692 -0.0213 140% 0.0061 -40%
2006/07 -0.0230 0.0714 -0.2692 -0.0192 84% -0.0038 17%
2007/08 -0.0168 0.0061 -0.2535 -0.0016 9% -0.0153 91%
2008/09 -0.0095 0.0406 -0.2467 -0.0100 106% 0.0005 -6%
2009/10 -0.0138 0.0311 -0.2287 -0.0071 51% -0.0067 49%
Table PER-3: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth components
New approach - Peru 2005/10
Poverty C1: Average C2: Sensitivity Correlation C1C2 C3
Period Change growth rates to growth Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(∆P (α = 1)) (g¯) (η¯+) Corr(η(p), g(p)) Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
2005/06 -0.0152 0.0221 -0.2692 -0.9593 -0.0065 43% -0.0087 57%
2006/07 -0.0230 0.0376 -0.2692 -0.9088 -0.0101 44% -0.0129 56%
2007/08 -0.0168 0.0273 -0.2535 -0.8286 -0.0069 41% -0.0099 59%
2008/09 -0.0095 0.0156 -0.2467 -0.6707 -0.0039 41% -0.0056 59%
2009/10 -0.0138 0.0219 -0.2287 -0.8279 -0.0050 36% -0.0088 64%
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Table PER-4: Social transition matrices by deciles: Peru 2007-10
2008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
20
07
1 5.22 1.91 1.24 0.67 0.21 0.46 0.19 0.02 0 0
2 2.19 3.5 2.23 1.01 0.53 0.14 0.15 0.1 0.13 0.02
3 1.42 2.13 1.73 1.6 1.48 1.02 0.31 0.06 0.1 0.19
4 0.55 1.09 1.56 1.85 1.66 1.29 1.06 0.66 0.08 0.09
5 0.17 0.8 1.72 1.86 1.54 1.72 1.16 0.92 0.1 0.12
6 0.17 0.35 0.58 1.21 1.8 1.81 1.77 1.15 1.01 0.15
7 0.22 0.15 0.55 1.12 1.55 1.24 1.85 1.74 1.14 0.39
8 0.04 0.05 0.31 0.28 0.82 1.08 1.98 1.95 2.15 1.37
9 0 0.02 0.02 0.36 0.36 1.06 1.26 2.04 2.76 2.11
10 0 0 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.27 1.37 2.53 5.59
2009
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
20
08
1 4.57 3 0.97 0.76 0.45 0.1 0.1 0 0.03 0
2 3.03 2.36 1.84 1.32 0.71 0.45 0.21 0.07 0.02 0
3 1.36 2.04 1.49 1.62 1.23 0.65 0.5 0.35 0.66 0.09
4 0.5 1.24 1.68 1.56 1.72 1.24 1.43 0.36 0.06 0.18
5 0.26 0.66 1.75 2.11 1.97 1.9 0.97 0.25 0.14 0.01
6 0.13 0.34 1.15 1.1 1.48 2.2 1.6 1.33 0.52 0.13
7 0.01 0.27 0.6 0.7 1.52 1.54 1.75 1.83 1.26 0.53
8 0 0.06 0.3 0.54 0.63 0.99 1.79 2.37 1.9 1.41
9 0 0.1 0.22 0.17 0.23 0.65 1.11 2.32 2.57 2.59
10 0 0 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.25 0.55 1.11 2.64 5.25
2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
20
09
1 4.47 2.35 1.71 0.44 0.47 0.24 0.1 0.02 0.05 0
2 3.03 2.89 1.74 1.15 0.75 0.11 0.21 0.14 0.07 0
3 1.02 1.92 2.23 1.75 1.02 1.02 0.47 0.15 0.3 0.16
4 1 1.16 1.55 2.06 1.49 1.29 0.81 0.41 0.11 0.12
5 0.22 0.49 1.1 2.03 2.31 1.91 0.99 0.64 0.17 0.16
6 0.11 0.35 0.77 0.98 1.48 1.73 1.88 1.36 0.63 0.68
7 0.04 0.28 0.65 0.92 1.28 1.54 1.41 1.86 1.43 0.61
8 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.36 0.47 1.62 1.99 2.22 2.33 0.77
9 0.08 0.48 0.08 0.16 0.27 0.52 1.44 1.75 2.94 2.08
10 0 0 0.03 0.12 0.32 0.18 0.71 1.36 2 5.48
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Table PER-5: Social transition matrices by deciles: Peru 2007-10
2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
20
07
1 4.18 2.39 1.41 0.44 0.52 0.16 0.32 0.17 0.08 0.27
2 2.46 2.4 2.04 1.34 0.69 0.34 0.31 0.16 0.23 0.04
3 1.48 1.68 2.31 1.12 1.43 0.96 0.41 0.35 0.28 0.04
4 0.94 1.48 1.63 1.86 1.54 0.89 0.8 0.34 0.3 0.11
5 0.3 0.85 1.09 1.88 1.36 1.83 1.18 0.9 0.62 0.1
6 0.3 0.67 0.68 1.49 1.14 1.93 1.53 0.74 0.91 0.61
7 0.26 0.4 0.33 1.09 0.99 1.59 1.78 1.85 0.84 0.82
8 0.01 0.05 0.34 0.28 1.48 1.09 1.58 2.36 1.73 1.11
9 0.06 0.07 0.1 0.37 0.6 0.98 1.66 2.13 2.32 1.69
10 0 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.1 0.37 0.44 0.92 2.73 5.27
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Table PER-6: Mobility statistics
Stayers Downwards Upwards
All (p <= 0.5) (p > 0.5) All (p <= 0.5) (p > 0.5) All (p <= 0.5) (p > 0.5)
2007/08 27.8% 13.8% 14.0% 36.6% 13.5% 23.1% 35.6% 22.6% 13.0%
2008/09 26.1% 12.0% 14.1% 37.4% 14.6% 22.8% 36.5% 23.4% 13.1%
2009/10 27.7% 14.0% 13.8% 36.1% 13.5% 22.6% 36.1% 22.5% 13.6%
2007/10 25.8% 12.1% 13.7% 38.3% 13.8% 24.5% 35.9% 24.1% 11.8%
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Figure PER-1: Change in Headcount, growth and redistribution: Peru 2005/10
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Redistribution 0.30% -0.87% -2.70% 1.04% -1.43%
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Figure PER-2: Change in poverty gap, growth and redistribution: Peru 2005/10
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Figure PER-3: Growth incidence curves in Peru : (Q2(p)−Q1(p))/Q1(p)
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Figure PER-4: First order absolutely pro-poor : Peru 2005/10
Primal approach: ((P2(z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure PER-5: First order absolutely pro-poor : Peru 2005/10
Dual approach: ((Q2(p)−Q1(p)))
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Figure PER-6: Second order absolutely pro-poor : Peru 2005/10
Primal approach: ((zP2(z, α = 1)− zP1(z, α = 1))
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Figure PER-7: Second order absolutely pro-poor : Peru 2005/10
Dual approach: ((GL2(p)−GL1(p)))
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Figure PER-8: First order relatively pro-poor : Peru 2005/10
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure PER-9: First order relatively pro-poor : Peru 2005/10
Dual approach: ((Q2(p)/Q1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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Figure PER-10: Second order relatively pro-poor : Peru 2005/10
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 1)− P1(z, α = 1))
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Figure PER-11: Second order relatively pro-poor : Peru 2005/10
Dual approach: ((GL2(p)/GL1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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Figure PER-12: First order relatively pro-poor: Peru 2007-2010
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure PER-13: Second order relatively pro-poor: Peru 2007-2010
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 1)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure PER-14: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth
components - Kraay 2004 approach -
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(a) Growth  rate of average incomes   estimated at population level
(b) Sensitivity of poverty to growth in average income*(a)
(c) Poverty-reducing pattern of growth in relative incomes
Figure PER-15: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth
components - New approach -
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Figure PER-16: Non-anonymous first order absolutely pro-poor : Peru 2007/10
(Initial period of reference: (E[y2|y1 = Q1(p)]/Q1(p)− 1)
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Figure PER-17: Non-anonymous first order absolutely pro-poor : Peru 2007/10
(Final period of reference: (Q2(p)/E[y1|y2 = Q2(p)]− 1)
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Figure PER-18: The inter temporal pro-poor growth: Peru 2007/10
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The Ecuadorian results
Table ECU-1: Trend of average per capita income, poverty and inequality: Ecuador 2005/10
Year Average Yearly Headcount Yearly Poverty Yearly Gini Yearly
income variation variation gap variation index variation
2005 146.3 42.2 18.8 0.548
2006 159.8 13.50* 37.6 -4.56*** 15.5 -3.37*** 0.540 -0.0090
2007 167.1 7.3 36.7 -0.87 15.3 -0.13 0.551 0.0110
2008 157.4 -9.7 35.1 -1.65* 14.5 -0.85* 0.515 -0.036***
2009 148.9 -8.52* 36.0 0.94 14.4 -0.04 0.504 -0.0110
2010 162.3 13.42*** 32.8 -3.27*** 12.6 -1.80*** 0.505 0.0010
Sampling design is fully taken into account in computing the standard errors.
∗p ≤ 0.10, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table ECU-2: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth components
Kraay (2004) approach - Ecuador 2005/10
Poverty C1: Average C2: Sensitivity C1C2 C3: Pattern of growth in relative incomes
Period Change growth to growth Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(∆P (α = 1)) (g) (∫ η(p)) Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
2005/06 -0.0337 0.0923 -0.2172 -0.0201 59 -0.0137 41
2006/07 -0.0013 0.0456 -0.2040 -0.0093 722 0.0080 -622
2007/08 -0.0085 -0.0578 -0.2049 0.0118 -139 -0.0204 239
2008/09 -0.0004 -0.0541 -0.1908 0.0103 -2343 -0.0108 2443
2009/10 -0.0180 0.0902 -0.2002 -0.0181 100 0.0000 -0
Table ECU-3: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth components
New approach - Ecuador 2005/10
Poverty C1: Average C2: Sensitivity Correlation C1C2 C3
Period Change growth rates to growth Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(∆P (α = 1)) (g¯) (∫ η(p)) Corr(η(p), g(p)) Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
2005/06 -0.0337 0.0772 -0.2172 -0.5630 -0.0168 50 -0.0170 50
2006/07 -0.0013 -0.0026 -0.2022 -0.2374 0.0005 -41 -0.0018 141
2007/08 -0.0085 0.0161 -0.2052 -0.5421 -0.0033 39 -0.0052 61
2008/09 -0.0004 0.0043 -0.2041 0.0469 -0.0009 199 0.0004 -99
2009/10 -0.0180 0.0380 -0.2000 -0.5855 -0.0076 42 -0.0104 58
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Figure ECU-1: Change in Headcount, growth and redistribution: Ecuador
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Figure ECU-2: Change in poverty gap, growth and redistribution: Ecuador
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Figure ECU-3: Growth incidence curves in Ecuador : (Q2(p)−Q1(p))/Q1(p)
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Figure ECU-4: First order absolutely pro-poor : Ecuador 2005/10
Primal approach: ((P2(z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure ECU-5: First order absolutely pro-poor : Ecuador 2005/10
Dual approach: ((Q2(p)−Q1(p)))
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Figure ECU-6: Second order absolutely pro-poor : Ecuador 2005/10
Primal approach: ((zP2(z, α = 1)− zP1(z, α = 1))
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Figure ECU-7: Second order absolutely pro-poor : Ecuador 2005/10
Dual approach: ((GL2(p)−GL1(p)))
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Figure ECU-8: First order relatively pro-poor : Ecuador 2005/10
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure ECU-9: First order relatively pro-poor : Ecuador 2005/10
Dual approach: ((Q2(p)/Q1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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Figure ECU-10: Second order relatively pro-poor : Ecuador 2005/10
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 1)− P1(z, α = 1))
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Figure ECU-11: Second order relatively pro-poor : Ecuador 2005/10
Dual approach: ((GL2(p)/GL1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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Figure ECU-12: First order absolute pro-poor: Ecuador 2005-2010
Primal approach: ((P2(z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure ECU-13: First order relatively pro-poor: Ecuador 2005-2010
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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The Bolivian results
Table BOL-1: Trend of average per capita income, poverty and inequality: Bolivia 2005/09
Year Average Yearly Headcount Yearly Poverty Yearly Gini Yearly
income variation variation gap variation index variation
2005 800.8 59.38 33.16 0.593
2006 800.2 -0.6 59.76 0.39 32.31 -0.85 0.582 -0.0100
2007 783.9 -16.3 59.80 0.03 30.37 -1.94 0.560 -0.0220
2008 716.9 -66.96* 57.26 -2.54* 27.79 -2.58** 0.504 -0.056***
2009 753.3 36.4 51.33 -5.93*** 24.61 -3.18*** 0.482 -0.021*
Sampling design is fully taken into account in computing the standard errors.
∗p ≤ 0.10, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table BOL-2: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth components
Kraay (2004) approach - Bolivia 2005/09
Poverty C1: Average C2: Sensitivity C1C2 C3: Pattern of growth in relative incomes
Period Change growth to growth Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(∆P (α = 1)) (g) (∫ η(p)) Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
2005/06 -0.0085 -0.0007 -0.2616 0.0002 -2 -0.0087 102
2006/07 -0.0194 -0.0204 -0.2734 0.0056 -29 -0.0250 129
2007/08 -0.0258 -0.0854 -0.2830 0.0242 -94 -0.0500 194
2008/09 -0.0318 0.0508 -0.2642 -0.0134 42 -0.0183 58
Table BOL-3: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth components
New approach - Bolivia 2005/09
Poverty C1: Average C2: Sensitivity Correlation C1C2 C3
Period Change growth rates to growth Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(∆P (α = 1)) (g¯) (∫ η(p)) Corr(η(p), g(p)) Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
2005/06 -0.0085 0.0882 -0.2651 0.2384 -0.0234 274 0.0149 -174
2006/07 -0.0194 0.0498 -0.2735 -0.2683 -0.0136 70 -0.0058 30
2007/08 -0.0258 0.0737 -0.2836 -0.1077 -0.0209 81 -0.0049 19
2008/09 -0.0318 0.0530 -0.2637 -0.6536 -0.0140 44 -0.0178 56
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Figure BOL-1: Change in Headcount, growth and redistribution: Bolivia 2005/09
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Figure BOL-2: Change in poverty gap, growth and redistribution: Bolivia 2005/09
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Figure BOL-3: Growth incidence curves in Bolivia : (Q2(p)−Q1(p))/Q1(p)
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Figure BOL-4: First order absolutely pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Primal approach: ((P2(z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure BOL-5: First order absolutely pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Dual approach: ((Q2(p)−Q1(p)))
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Figure BOL-6: Second order absolutely pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Primal approach: (z(P2(z, α = 1)− P1(z, α = 1))
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Figure BOL-7: Second order absolutely pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Dual approach: ((GL2(p)−GL1(p)))
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Figure BOL-8: First order relatively pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure BOL-9: First order relatively pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Dual approach: ((Q2(p)/Q1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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Figure BOL-10: Second order relatively pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 1)− P1(z, α = 1))
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Figure BOL-11: Second order relatively pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Dual approach: ((GL2(p)/GL1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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Figure BOL-12: First order relatively pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure BOL-13: First order relatively pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Dual approach: ((Q2(p)/Q1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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Figure BOL-14: Second order relatively pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 1)− P1(z, α = 1))
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Figure BOL-15: Second order relatively pro-poor : Bolivia 2005/09
Dual approach: ((GL2(p)/GL1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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The Venezuelan results
Table VEN-1: Trend of average per capita income, poverty and inequality: Venezuela 2005/10
Year Average Yearly Headcount Yearly Poverty Yearly Gini Yearly
income variation variation gap variation index variation
2005 805.1 43.79 19.8 0.461
2006 901.2 96.05*** 36.28 -7.51*** 13.7 -6.01*** 0.422 -0.039***
2007 918.8 17.7 33.59 -2.69*** 12.3 -1.46*** 0.406 -0.016***
2008 958.1 39.25*** 32.53 -1.06 12.5 0.21 0.404 -0.0020
2009 923.6 -34.47*** 31.78 -0.75 11.4 -1.10*** 0.392 -0.012***
2010 884.3 -39.27*** 32.23 0.45 11.1 -0.34 0.371 -0.021***
Sampling design is fully taken into account in computing the standard errors.
∗p ≤ 0.10, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table VEN-2: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth components
Kraay (2004) approach - Ecuador 2005/10
Poverty C1: Average C2: Sensitivity C1C2 C3: Pattern of growth in relative incomes
Period Change growth to growth Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(∆P (α = 1)) (g) (∫ η(p)) Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
2005/06 -0.0601 0.1193 -0.2204 -0.0263 44 -0.0338 56
2006/07 -0.0146 0.0196 -0.2138 -0.0042 29 -0.0104 71
2007/08 0.0021 0.0427 -0.2839 -0.0121 -577 0.0142 677
2008/09 -0.0110 -0.0360 -0.1995 0.0072 -65 -0.0182 165
2009/10 -0.0034 -0.0425 -0.2327 0.0099 -294 -0.0133 394
Table VEN-3: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth components
New approach - Ecuador 2005/10
Poverty C1: Average C2: Sensitivity Correlation C1C2 C3
Period Change growth rates to growth Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(∆P (α = 1)) (g¯) (∫ η(p)) Corr(η(p), g(p)) Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
2005/06 -0.0601 0.1914 -0.2200 -0.1485 -0.0421 70 -0.0180 30
2006/07 -0.0146 0.0281 -0.2134 -0.6111 -0.0060 41 -0.0086 59
2007/08 0.0021 -0.0231 -0.2892 -0.0782 0.0067 318 -0.0046 -218
2008/09 -0.0110 0.0608 -0.2002 0.0100 -0.0122 110 0.0011 -10
2009/10 -0.0034 0.0095 -0.2334 -0.0648 -0.0022 66 -0.0011 34
90
Figure VEN-1: Change in Headcount, growth and redistribution: Ecuador
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Figure VEN-2: Change in poverty gap, growth and redistribution: Ecuador
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Figure VEN-3: Growth incidence curves in Ecuador : (Q2(p)−Q1(p))/Q1(p)
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Figure VEN-4: First order absolutely pro-poor : Venezuela 2005/10
Primal approach: ((P2(z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure VEN-5: First order absolutely pro-poor : Venezuela 2005/10
Dual approach: ((Q2(p)−Q1(p)))
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Figure VEN-6: Second order absolutely pro-poor : Venezuela 2005/10
Primal approach: (z(P2(z, α = 1)− zP1(z, α = 1))
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Figure VEN-7: Second order absolutely pro-poor : Venezuela 2005/10
Dual approach: ((GL2(p)−GL1(p)))
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Figure VEN-8: First order relatively pro-poor : Venezuela 2005/10
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure VEN-9: First order relatively pro-poor : Venezuela 2005/10
Dual approach: ((Q2(p)/Q1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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Figure VEN-10: Second order relatively pro-poor : Venezuela 2005/10
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 1)− P1(z, α = 1))
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Figure VEN-11: Second order relatively pro-poor : Venezuela 2005/10
Dual approach: ((GL2(p)/GL1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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Figure VEN-12: First order absolute pro-poor: Venezuela 2005-2010
Primal approach: ((P2(z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure VEN-13: First order relatively pro-poor: Venezuela 2005-2010
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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The Colombian results
Table COL-1: Trend of average per capita income, poverty and inequality: Colombia 2004/10
Year Average Yearly Headcount Yearly Poverty Yearly Gini Yearly
income variation variation gap variation index variation
2004 338137.0 47.36% 19.82% 0.5295
2005 357753.5 19616.48*** 44.95% -2.40*** 18.38% -1.44*** 0.5306 0.0010
2008 390182.1 32428.72*** 42.00% -2.95*** 18.36% -0.02 0.5430 0.012***
2009 399621.0 9438.75** 40.22% -1.79*** 16.74% -1.62*** 0.5331 -0.010***
2010 429667.6 30046.60*** 37.17% -3.04*** 15.12% -1.62*** 0.5359 0.0030
Sampling design is fully taken into account in computing the standard errors.
∗p ≤ 0.10, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table COL-2: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth components
Kraay (2004) approach - Colombia 2004/010
Poverty C1: Average C2: Sensitivity C1C2 C3: Pattern of growth in relative incomes
Period Change growth to growth Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(∆P (α = 1)) (g) (∫ η(p)) Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
2004/2005 -0.0144 0.058 -0.2639 -0.0153 107 0.0009 -7
2005/2008 -0.0002 0.0906 -0.2649 -0.024 12000 0.0238 -11900
2008/2009 -0.0162 0.0242 -0.2309 -0.0056 34 -0.0106 66
2009/2010 -0.0162 0.0752 -0.219 -0.0165 102 0.0003 -2
Table COL-3: Decomposition of change in poverty gap into pro-poor growth components
New approach - Colombia 2004/010
Poverty C1: Average C2: Sensitivity Correlation C1C2 C3
Period Change growth rates to growth Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(∆P (α = 1)) (g¯) (∫ η(p)) Corr(η(p), g(p)) Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
2004/05 -0.0144 0.0278 -0.2639 -0.6562 -0.0073 51 -0.0071 49
2005/08 -0.0002 -0.0185 -0.2649 -0.1853 0.0049 -2882 -0.0051 2982
2008/09 -0.0162 0.0437 -0.2309 -0.1726 -0.0101 62 -0.0061 38
2009/10 -0.0162 0.0354 -0.2190 -0.2951 -0.0078 48 -0.0084 52
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Figure COL-1: Change in headcount, growth and redistribution: Colombia
2004/10
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Figure COL-2: Change in poverty gap, growth and redistribution: Colombia
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Figure COL-3: Growth incidence curves in Colombia : (Q2(p)−Q1(p))/Q1(p)
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Figure COL-4: First order absolutely pro-poor : Colombia 2004/10
Primal approach: ((P2(z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure COL-5: First order absolutely pro-poor : Colombia 2004/10
Dual approach: ((Q2(p)−Q1(p)))
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Figure COL-6: Second order absolutely pro-poor : Colombia 2004/10
Primal approach: (z(P2(z, α = 1)− zP1(z, α = 1))
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Figure COL-8: First order relatively pro-poor : Colombia 2004/10
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure COL-9: First order relatively pro-poor : Colombia 2004/10
Dual approach: ((Q2(p)/Q1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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Figure COL-10: Second order relatively pro-poor : Colombia 2004/10
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 1)− P1(z, α = 1))
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Figure COL-11: Second order relatively pro-poor : Colombia 2004/10
Dual approach: ((GL2(p)/GL1(p)− µ2/µ1))
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Figure COL-12: First order absolute pro-poor: Colombia 2005-2010
Primal approach: ((P2(z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Figure COL-13: First order relatively pro-poor: Colombia 2005-2010
Primal approach: ((P2((1 + g)z, α = 0)− P1(z, α = 0))
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Latino American Andean Countries results
Table LAA-1: First order dominance of prop-poor growth in the Latino American Andean countries
Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
Period Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
2005/06 √ √ √
2006/07
√ √ √
2007/08
√ √ √
2008/09
√ √ √ √
2009/10
√ √ √ √
All period
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
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Table LAA-2: Second order dominance of prop-poor growth in the Latino American Andean countries
Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
Period Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
2005/06
√ √ √
2006/07 √ √ √
2007/08
√ √ √ √ √
2008/09 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
2009/10
√ √ √ √
All period
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
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Figure LAA-1: The trend of growth in GDP in the Latino American Andean coun-
tries
(2005 to 2010)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Bolivia 3.7 4.1 4.5 4.6 6.1 3.4 4.2
Colombia 3.6 5.2 6.8 8.2 2.5 0.8 4.3
Ecuador 5.8 4.7 4.1 2 6.5 0.4 3.2
Peru 4.5 6.4 8 9 9.8 0.9 8.8
Venezuela 16.8 9.3 10.3 8.4 4.8 -3.3 -1.9
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Figure LAA-2: The trend of growth in per capita income/consumption in the
Latino American Andean countries
(2005 to 2010)
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10
Bolivia -0.07 -2.04 -8.54 5.08
Colombia 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.42 7.52
Ecuador 9.23 4.56 -5.78 -5.41 9.01
Peru 7.28 7.14 0.61 4.06 3.11
Venezuela 11.93 1.96 4.27 -3.60 -4.25
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Figure LAA-3: The trend of headcount in the Latino American Andean countries
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Bolivia 59.38% 59.76% 59.80% 57.26% 51.33%
Colombia 44.95% 42.00% 40.22% 37.17%
Ecuador 42.2% 37.6% 36.7% 35.1% 36.0% 32.8%
Peru 48.7% 44.5% 39.3% 36.2% 34.8% 31.3%
Venezuela 43.79% 36.28% 33.59% 32.53% 31.78% 32.23%
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Figure LAA-4: The trend of inequality in the Latino American Andean countries
(2005 to 2010)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Bolivia 0.593 0.582 0.560 0.504 0.482
Colombia 0.531 0.543 0.533 0.536
Ecuador 0.548 0.540 0.551 0.515 0.504 0.505
Peru 0.379 0.385 0.379 0.353 0.358 0.345
Venezuela 0.461 0.422 0.406 0.404 0.392 0.371
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Figure LAA-5: The growth incidence curves for the period of 2008 to 2009
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Figure LAA-6: The growth incidence curves for the period of 2009 to 2010
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